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Recent market developments raise doubts regarding further spread of household stock market participation. We 
study, computationally and econometrically, net gains from access to stocks, and estimate the potentially 
changing role of their determinants across the distribution of such gains for US households. We highlight 
conflicting influences on net gains using a computational portfolio model, and use empirical estimates to derive 
differences in characteristics of potential entrants relative to marginal investors by the end of the dramatic recent 
expansion in the stockholder base. Findings suggest that downturns can have significant effects around the 
participation margin, through their influence on incomes, wealth, and employment. The role of education is 
found more limited than typically estimated, and confined to the low end of the gains distribution. Estimated 
characteristics of potential entrants relative to marginal stockholders suggest that further growth in participation 
poses considerable challenges, in view of more limited finances, younger age, more limited education and 
financial alertness, and above all significantly less self-declared willingness to assume financial risk by potential 
stockholders compared to marginal investors. The hurdle to financial practitioners interested in expanding the 
stockolder base is not estimated to be small. 
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References          1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent empirical studies have documented substantial increases in the proportion of households
holding stocks, either directly or indirectly through mutual funds and retirement accounts.1 This
spread of ‘equity culture’ has been linked to investor euphoria in the 1990s and to supply-side
developments such as privatization of public utilities, growth of the mutual fund industry with
concomitant reductions in participation costs for investors,2 as well as the demographic transition
and consequent policies to promote individual retirement accounts. In the current decade, when
about one in two US households already holds stocks and euphoria has been tempered by recession
and stock market downturns, continued growth of the stockholder base cannot be taken for granted.
Concerns are often voiced for a possible exodus by marginal stockholders who feel the pressure of the
economic downturn. At the same time, there are continued eﬀorts to attract potential stockholders
on the part of ﬁrms, brokers, and managers of mutual funds and other managed accounts. It thus
becomes crucial to understand which factors gain or lose prominence in household stock market
participation decisions and how the demographic composition of the pool of most likely potential
entrants changes as stock market participation spreads. For example, products and strategies
designed to attract highly educated, aﬄuent households willing to undertake ﬁnancial risk are
likely to be much less eﬀective when applied to households with fewer resources, limited ability to
process ﬁnancial information, and considerable lack of willingness to undertake ﬁnancial risk.
Stock market participation is typically regarded as based on expected gains net of any partic-
ipation costs, and it has received considerable attention in recent literature.3 Existing empirical
studies employ probit or logit estimation to show that richer households are not scaled-up versions
of poorer households (Carroll, 2001) and that participation is inﬂuenced by education, risk aver-
sion, and employment status, while the role of age, if any, is less clear and less consistent across
countries.4 Though useful, these standard techniques cannot be used to uncover the potentially
changing role of household characteristics as participation spreads to lower percentiles of the net
gains distribution. They instead estimate the role of each factor on mean net gains and assume
that it is the same for all households regardless of their position in the distribution of net gains.
This paper applies new methods, of binary quantile regression, speciﬁcally designed to estimate
coeﬃcients at diﬀerent points of the distribution of the latent variable conditional on its covariates.
Our econometric ﬁndings in this paper, using pooled US data from the 1995 and 1998 Surveys
of Consumer Finances, suggest that there is considerable variation in the estimated inﬂuence of
each factor depending on the position of the household in the distribution of net gains from access.
When we use our estimates to rank households by probability of participation based on their demo-
graphics, we ﬁnd that likely potential entrants diﬀer in important respects from current marginal
stockholders, most notably in their much more limited declared willingness to undertake ﬁnancial
risk and to look around for the best investment opportunities, and in their more modest ﬁnancial
resources. Such factors are likely to make it much more diﬃcult for the ﬁnancial sector to expand
the stockholding base further, e.g. by designing ﬁnancial products likely to appeal to potential
stockholders, than it has in the past. As an indication of how much more diﬃcult the task will
be, we estimate increases in ﬁnancial assets that would be necessary to oﬀset the deterioration
in remaining characteristics of potential stockholders and to produce probabilities of participation
analogous to those of current marginal stockholders. We ﬁnd that such increases are far from
negligible.
As a prelude to the empirical analysis, the paper employs computational methods to shed light
on the often conﬂicting roles of important determinants of gains from access to stocks net of any
costs. Existing literature has established that ﬁxed costs are important for participation decisions.5
2In lieu of direct observation of actual or perceived ﬁxed costs, the literature estimates threshold cost
levels suﬃcient to deter participation by optimizing households. Empirical estimates of such costs
(Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Paiella, 2001), as well as estimates from inﬁnite-horizon computational
models (Haliassos and Michaelides, 2003) suggest that reasonably small costs could keep most
households out of the stock market. Our analysis incorporates one-time ﬁxed costs of entry and
per-period access costs.
We solve a modern calibrated dynamic model of household portfolio choice with non-diversiﬁable
income risk, a ﬁnite horizon, uncertain length of life, and a retirement period. Although the model
ﬁts reasonably well mean stockholdings of college graduates during working life, its purpose is not
to match data on portfolios of diﬀerent demographic groups, but to provide guidance in interpreting
coeﬃcient estimates on net gains. To do so, we vary one relevant factor at a time, while ﬁxing
all other factors to the same level across all demographic groups, in a manner analogous to the
exercise of interpreting regression estimates. Thus, we gain insights into the direction of the eﬀect
of, say, varying educational attainment , but we do not attempt to estimate net gains for diﬀerent
education groups. Such welfare analysis would require an elaborate data-matching exercise beyond
the scope of this paper.6 We focus on a number of factors that have received attention in studies
of portfolio choice. Education eﬀects are introduced through the household income process and
through variation in the level of access costs relative to the permanent component of income. We
also examine the role of ﬁnancial resources, risk aversion, age, and of two important features of
the stock market environment, namely the size of the perceived equity premium and stock market
volatility.
In Section 2, we describe the computational model and the concept of gains, as well as calibration
of the model. Section 2.6 uses the calibrated model to discuss the role of education, age, ﬁnancial
resources, and degree of risk aversion for the size of net gains from stock market access. In Section
3, we describe the quantile regression approach that we follow in our econometric estimation.
Section 4 describes the data and recent trends in stock market participation in the United States.
Section 5 reports our empirical ﬁndings on coeﬃcient estimates, on the implied demographics of
potential stockholders versus current marginal stockholders, and on implied costs of the diﬀerence
in demographics across the two groups. Section 6 concludes.
2G a i n s f r o m A c c e s s t o S t o c k s
2.1 Deﬁnition of Gains
We model ﬁnite-horizon households that choose savings and portfolio share of the risky asset to max-
imize lifetime expected utility, taking as known and given asset return processes, income process,
and any borrowing constraints and entry or per period access costs they face. We compare two
situations: one in which the household has access to the riskless asset but no access to stocks; and
another in which the household has access to stocks, as well, and can choose whether and how
much to hold, after payment of any access costs. Gains from access to stocks at a point in the life
cycle are deﬁned as the diﬀerence in value functions of the two problems at that point in time and
for the values of the state variable(s) faced by the household. Note that this speciﬁcation of gains
from stock market access is consistent with households not holding stocks when they do not ﬁnd it
optimal to do so. Although net gains are unobservable (a ‘latent variable’ in econometric speciﬁ-
cations), and no analytical expression can be derived for them in the presence of non-diversiﬁable
income risk, their dependence on state variables and on household characteristics can be studied
by use of modern computational methods.
32.2 Value Function for a Household with Access to Stocks
We ﬁrst consider a household with ﬁnite horizon but uncertain lifetime, that maximizes expected
intertemporal utility faced with a menu of a risky and a riskless asset. The value of the household’s
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+ Yt+1 (3)
Ct ≥ 0 (4)
0 ≤t α ≤ 1 (5)
All variables are in real terms. St is the real amount of total saving between the beginning of period
t and of period t +1 ,α t is the portfolio share of the risky asset held between t and t +1 ,E t
denotes the mathematical expectation operator based on information available up to the beginning
of period t, β is the discount factor that satisﬁes 0 <β<1, b sj is the probability that the household
is alive in period j, conditional on being alive in period j − 1.U (Ct) is the felicity derived from
consumption in period t, Xt is cash on hand at the beginning of period t,deﬁned as the sum of
net wealth and labor income, e Rt+1 is the risky gross return on stocks held between period t and
t +1 ,R f is the gross riskless rate assumed time-invariant, Yt is income received at the beginning
of t, and Pt refers to the permanent component of income, deﬁned below. The term “income” is
used loosely to encompass all after-tax income from transfers and wages, including pension income.
Ft ≥ 0 is the exogenous, ﬁxed per period real cost of access to the stock market. The nature of
stock market access costs is discussed in Section 2.4. Note that V S
0 is a function of access costs,
but this dependence is omitted for brevity. The size of cash on hand at the beginning of life, X0,
is given.
The budget constraint (2) will hold with equality in equilibrium, given non-satiation. We employ






,ρ 6=1 ,ρ > 0 (6)
Constraint (4) is never binding under CRRA utility, since lim
Ct→0
U0(Ct)=∞.
Denote by b β the product of the discount factor with the conditional probability that the house-








where θ is either S or α. Now,
Ct+1 =
h
Rt+1 +(e Rt+1 − Rt+1)αt
i
St + Yt+1 − St+1 − Ft+1 (8)
Thus, the ﬁrst order condition for saving, θt ≡ St, is
U0(Xt − St − Ft)=b βE t
nh





4and for the portfolio share of stocks, θt ≡ αt,i s
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In the presence of constraint (5), which precludes borrowing at the riskless or the risky rate, this
formulation generates ranges of cash on hand in which it is optimal to hold no stocks. Intuitively, in
such ranges, households may like to transfer consumption from the future to the present borrowing
at the riskless rate. Being precluded from doing so, they may be willing to borrow even at the risky
rate through short sales of stock. When short sales are not allowed, they end up at a corner with
zero stockholding and no other saving.7
The value function in period t is V S
t (Xt,P t), a function of household age, t, of total cash on




U(Ct)+b βE tV S
t+1(Xt+1,P t+1). (11)
Income of household i, Yit, is assumed to entail non-diversiﬁable risk because of moral hazard and
adverse selection considerations. Observed income follows
Yit = PitUit, (12)
where Uit is a transitory shock. During working life, the permanent component, Pit,f o l l o w s
Pit = GtPit−1Nit (13)
and is thus subject to shocks, Nit. During retirement it follows the deterministic process
Pit = GtPit−1 (14)
so that retirement income is only subject to transitory shocks. We assume that lnUit and lnNit





n, respectively. The lognormality of Uit and the assumption about the mean of
its logarithm imply that
EUit =e x p ( −.5 ∗ σ2
u + .5 ∗ σ2
u)=1 (15)
and similarly for ENit. Thus, the permanent component of income is the value observed when
transitory shocks are at their expected value. The growth factor, Gt, is assumed to be a function of
household characteristics. Variances σ2
u and σ2
n and growth factors Gt are calibrated using empirical
estimates for diﬀerent education categories, distinguishing between working life and retirement (see
below).
To reduce the number of state variables by one, we normalize asset holdings and cash on hand
by the permanent component of labor income, Pit. Lower case letters denote normalized variables.
To simplify notation, we drop the subscript i. Recalling that marginal utility is homogeneous of
degree (−ρ) under CRRA preferences, we can rewrite the ﬁrst-order conditions (9) and (10) as





















5where ct+1(xt+1) denotes the policy function for normalized consumption in period t +1 .T h e
normalized state variable x evolves according to
xt+1 =
h
Rt+1 +(e Rt+1 − Rt+1)αt
i
st (Gt+1Nt+1)
−1 + Uit+1 (18)
Recalling that the value function is homogeneous of degree (1−ρ) when felicity exhibits constant





U(ct(xt)) + b βE t{Gt+1Nt+1}1−ρ V S
t (xt+1) (19)
2.3 Value Function for a Household without Access to Stocks
If the household has no access to stocks, it chooses only the real amount of bonds to hold. Denoting
by Bt saving in the (single) riskless asset, constraints can be derived by setting S ≡ B and α ≡ 0
above, and by replacing borrowing constraint (5) with Bt ≥ 0.Oﬀ corners, analytical ﬁrst order
conditions for saving are, upon normalization





Normalizing all variables by Pt, we write the Bellman equation for the value function of the problem











As analytical solutions are not available, we solve numerically the constrained portfolio and sav-
ing problems. We compute solutions in Matlab, using portfolio algorithms recently developed by
Haliassos and Mavridis to exploit some clever computational shortcuts proposed by Carroll (2002)
(see Appendix). We generate value functions V S
t (xt) and V B
t (xt) for each period t.
2.4 Gains and Costs of Stock Market Access
Subtracting the computed value function of a household without access, V B
t (xt), from that of a
household with access, V S
t (xt), we derive gains from stock market access
DVt(xt)=V S
t (xt) − V B
t (xt) (22)
as a function of normalized cash on hand and for given household characteristics (e.g., education
level, age, risk aversion, etc.). By varying one household characteristic at a time, keeping others
constant, we derive in Section 2.6 model predictions for the nature of eﬀects of this characteristic
on the systematic part of gains from access net of any costs incorporated in the computation of
value functions.
In principle, one can distinguish three potentially relevant types of such costs: a ﬁxed entry cost,
ap e rp e r i o dﬁxed cost, and a transactions cost that depends on the volume of stock transactions.
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) focused on stock market participation and found empirical support for the
ﬁrst two types of costs, but little role for the third type of costs in explaining observed participation
rates.
Our calibrated model incorporates ﬁxed entry costs and per period access costs. Fixed entry
costs can be thought of as the costs that a previously uninformed household pays in order to famil-
iarize itself with stocks and stock-related ﬁnancial assets (e.g., mutual funds, retirement accounts,
6etc.), and with the process of using them to smooth consumption intertemporally. Once these costs
are paid, the household perceives stock-related assets as part of its asset menu over its remaining
horizon, and it considers in each period whether and how much to invest in stocks. Processing in-
formation necessary to ﬁgure out optimal holdings in each future period (or assigning professionals
to do this) entails a per period normalized access cost fs for s ≥ t, that we incorporate in compu-
tation of V S
t .8 While this approach allows for entry and exit from holding stocks, it does not cover
the possibility that households who have gained access to the stock market subsequently decide to
ignore the presence of stockholding opportunities and resume solving the single-asset saving model.
Allowing for such voluntary restriction of the asset menu complicates the optimization problem
considerably more than introduction of per period participation costs that we have pursued here,
and has never been done to the best of our knowledge.
Gains in the presence of any ﬁxed (normalized) entry costs, k(xt), over and above the current
per period access cost are given by
De Vt(xt,k(xt)) = V S
t (xt − k(xt)) − V B
t (xt) (23)
Their computation is complicated by the fact that entry costs, as these are perceived by households
making the participation choice, are essentially unobservable and could vary signiﬁcantly among
households without any previous stock market experience. Rather than imposing some arbitrary
k(xt) and plotting (23) for that choice, we prefer to plot gains in the absence of ﬁxed entry costs
using (22), and then to solve for the b k(xt) that makes (23) equal to zero. This b k(xt) represents
the horizontal diﬀerence between the value functions with and without stock market access, and
it has two useful interpretations. One is as the monetary sum that should be taken away from a
household with access to stocks in order to eliminate its gains from such access. In this sense, it
is a dollar measure of how much stock market access is worth to a household with a particular set
of characteristics. Clearly, a household would not be willing to pay a ﬁxed entry cost in excess of
this amount in order to gain access to stocks. Hence, its second interpretation is as the (minimum)
ﬁxed entry cost (beyond the access cost ft paid at the time of entry) that would deter a household
of given characteristics from obtaining access to the stock market.
2.5 Calibration
2.5.1 Income Processes
Income is deﬁned as after-tax, non-asset income. It includes not only labor income, but also
government transfers, bequests, and lump-sum windfalls. We distinguish between three educa-
tion categories, based on the educational attainment of the household head: less than high-school
education, high-school graduates, and college graduates (or more). Income processes consist of
(deterministic) age-income proﬁles and of stochastic shocks. Income during working life is assumed
to follow equation (12), and its permanent component is modeled as
Pit = G(t,Zit) Pit−1Nit, (24)
where G(t,Zit) denotes the growth factor of the permanent component of income derived from
regressions of the logarithm of non-asset, after-tax income on age variables, separately on the
number of head and spouse, number of dependent adults, and number of children, on cohort
dummies (based on year of birth and split into ﬁve-year cohorts), and on the unemployment rate
in the household’s state of residence (as a proxy for time eﬀects). The permanent component of
income during retirement is assumed to take the form
Pit = GR(t,Zit) Pit−1, (25)
7i.e. retirement income is assumed to be subject only to transitory shocks. Regressions for log
income during working life allow for a third-order polynomial in age, while those for retirement
assume a linear age term. Coeﬃcient estimates are based on data from PSID 1983-1990 and are
taken from Laibson et al. (2000, Tables 3 and 4). The retirement age for high-school dropouts
is set to 61, for high-school graduates to 63, and for college graduates to 65, based on mean ages
observed in the data. Estimated age income proﬁles are hump-shaped during working age for all
education categories, but with diﬀerent peaks prior to retirement.
Education groups also face diﬀerences in the process followed by income shocks. We employ the
estimates of Carroll and Samwick (1997) regarding variances of transitory and permanent shocks,
(σ2
u,σ2
n), for diﬀerent education categories during working life.9 For high-school dropouts, we use the
Carroll-Samwick estimates for those who had completed between 9 and 12 grades: (0.0658,0.0214);
for high-school graduates, we use (0.0431,0.0277); and for college graduates (0.0385,0.0146). These
and other estimates in the literature suggest a decreasing pattern of risk associated with temporary
earnings shocks as education increases. There is a less clear pattern with respect to the variance
of permanent income shocks.
We follow Laibson et al. (2000) in modeling (logarithms of) shocks to retirement income as the
sum of a household ﬁxed eﬀect and of a purely transitory shock:
uR
it = ϑi + νR
it (26)
They estimate the variance of νR using residuals from the income regressions during retirement
years. Estimates of σ2
νR for high-school dropouts, high-school graduates, and college graduates are,
respectively, 0.077, 0.051, 0.042. In simulations, household ﬁxed eﬀects are set to zero.
2.5.2 Parameters
Conditional probabilities of survival are calculated from the 1998 United States Life Tables (Na-
tional Vital Statistics Report, 2001). We set the rate of time preference, δ ≡ β−1 − 1,e q u a lt o
0.05. The expected rate of return on equity, µr, is set to 0.06 in the benchmark runs, and the
constant real interest rate, r,t o0.01. Understating the historical equity premium is an often used
shortcut to introducing unaccounted for proportional costs, but we also consider higher values. The
assumed standard deviation of the equity premium is set at its historical value of 18 percent in
the benchmark, and raised to twice this level in sensitivity analysis. The benchmark value for risk
aversion is ρ =2 , but we also consider values up to ρ =8 .
Perceived access costs or participation costs are unobservable. Vissing Jorgensen (2002) has
estimated that per period participation costs of about 260 dollars (in 2000 prices) can account for
the behavior of 75 percent of non-participants in the stock market. Paiella’s (2001) estimates were
not far from those. We use a real amount of 250 dollars to calibrate the per period access cost,
normalized by permanent income derived from the age income proﬁle for each education category.
Assuming the same real cost of access across education categories is a useful benchmark, consistent
with the notion that less educated households face bigger access costs relative to permanent income.
Still, it is conservative in the sense that low-education households may indeed face higher real costs
than their more educated counterparts, leading to lower gains, both because they ﬁnd it more costly
to acquire and process such specialized ﬁnancial information, and because they do not typically
beneﬁt from the lower fees available to bigger investors.
82.6 Determinants of Gains from Stock Market Access
In this section, we study model predictions regarding the inﬂuence of household-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s
as well as of stock market factors, namely the equity premium and its volatility, on gains from stock
market access. We vary one factor at a time, holding all others constant, in order to isolate eﬀects,
and we diﬀerentiate between working life and retirement. We ﬁnd that even these fairly stylized
models uncover a rich pattern of often conﬂicting and sometimes surprising eﬀects.
2.6.1 Eﬀects of Education
A standard result in existing empirical literature based on probit or logit is that, controlling for
other characteristics, education increases the probability of participation. Usually, this is justiﬁed
by reference to higher ﬁxed entry and participation costs relative to permanent income for less
educated households. Higher costs can be attributed to greater diﬃc u l t yi np r o c e s s i n gﬁnancial
information, reduced or costlier access to sources such as the internet, and more limited access
to ﬁnancial advisors because of more limited scale of investments.10 Less attention is paid to the
size of potential gains from access to stocks, often presumed to be lower for the less educated,
controlling for other characteristics.
Figure 2 (top row) plots predicted net gains from access (22) against normalized cash on hand,
for diﬀerent education categories but for given other characteristics. The left column refers to
working households aged 45, while the right to retirees aged 70. The four lower panels show
policy functions for the portfolio share of stocks, real stock amounts, riskless asset holdings, and
consumption, all against normalized cash on hand. For given cash on hand and other characteristics
at age 45, increases in educational attainment reduce net gains from access to stocks over the
remaining lifetime.
The source of this result lies in the saving motives generated by the income processes of the
three categories.11 Age-income proﬁles by education are shown in Figure 1, and variances of income
shocks were presented in Section 2.5. Less educated households face higher variances of transitory
and permanent income shocks, earlier retirement, and worse prospects for income growth over
their working lives. Limited prospects for income growth create incentives for working high-school
dropouts to save more for the future, while higher income risk increases their precautionary saving
(see bottom row). Greater saving motives dominate lower (unconstrained) portfolio shares of stocks
for lower education households (second row) and deliver higher net gains.12 By age 70, the ratio of
per period access costs to permanent income is much smaller for college graduates than for lower-
education households, and this reverses education eﬀects among retirees. However, when we set
the per period participation cost to zero, gains continue to be inversely related to education even
at age 70 (see below).13
In principle, the eﬀe c to fi n c o m ep r o c e s s e so ng a i n sc o u l db er e v e r s e db yh i g h e re n t r ya n dp e r
period access costs for lower education households. Since such costs are unobservable, we examine
the sensitivity of net gains to two diﬀerent assumptions. Figure 3 (top row) plots normalized
monetary equivalents of gains from stock market access against normalized cash on hand, if all
education categories pay the same absolute per period cost of $250. This cost will, of course,
be higher relative to permanent income for lower-education households. The gains of 45-year-old
college graduates over their remaining lifetime, net of such per period access costs, are of the order
of a quarter of their annual permanent income component or less. They are about double if no
per period access costs are paid (Fig. 4). Any ﬁxed entry costs, likely to be smaller for more
educated households, should be subtracted from these ﬁgures. It is also possible to see the eﬀects
of diﬀerential absolute per period access costs, by combining the two Figures (e.g. no cost measures
9for college graduates with positive cost measures for high-school dropouts).14
Note that, as we vary education levels keeping all other characteristics ﬁxed, we can examine
if gains go up or down with education, but we should not necessarily interpret the levels of mon-
etary measures we obtain for lower education categories as estimates of actual net gains in this
category. The reason is that low-education households may diﬀer from college graduates in their
remaining characteristics, which are kept ﬁxed for purposes of our analysis. In unreported simula-
tions, we found that benchmark parameter settings approximate reasonably well stockholding by
college graduates during working life, but they tend to overstate ﬁnancial assets for other education
categories.
All in all, results highlight two conﬂicting eﬀects of education on net gains: a negative one
from more limited need to save for the future; and a positive one resulting from lower access costs
relative to permanent income associated with higher educational attainment.15 Our results suggest
that a positive education eﬀect on net gains, controlling for other characteristics, requires higher
entry/access costs for low-education households, not only relative to permanent income, but also
in absolute terms. We will see below that quantile regression limits positive education eﬀects to
households at the bottom of the distribution of net gains.
2.6.2 Eﬀects of Risk Aversion
Survey data include questions on willingness to undertake ﬁnancial risk. Here we explore the link
between demand for stocks and the unobservable degree of risk aversion, ρ, of the felicity function,
U(Ct). Figure 5 plots predicted net gains for college graduates under diﬀerent ρ. The second row of
Figures 3 and 4 presents monetary equivalents of gains, with and without access costs, respectively.
We ﬁnd that, at working age 45 (left column), higher values of ρ are associated with larger gains
from stock market access. At retirement age 70 (right column), diﬀerences are eliminated in all
but the lowest range of cash on hand, where the ranking is actually reversed. Implied diﬀerences in
monetary equivalents are small (of the order of 5,000 dollars), again about half of what they would
be without access costs.
Risk aversion aﬀects gains through two conﬂicting channels. Unconstrained portfolio shares of
stocks are lower at any normalized cash on hand (Fig. 5, second panel); but greater risk aversion also
implies higher prudence (precautionary motive) and thus larger precautionary wealth accumulation
(bottom row). The stockholding policy function (third row) shows that aversion to riskiness of
stocks dominates at high levels of cash on hand and in most of the range with positive stockholding
during retirement. However, there is a wide range of cash on hand, where it is optimal for the more
risk averse to hold more stocks. Payment commitments in the form of per-period access costs are
not suﬃcient to reverse this dominance of the precautionary eﬀect. By the age of 70, future income
risk is signiﬁcantly reduced and stock demand drops with risk aversion among savers (panel 5).
This produces diﬀerent rankings of net gains during retirement compared to working life.16 Thus,
higher risk aversion, ρ, is not necessarily associated with lower net gains from stock market access
nor with lower demand for stocks. A systematically positive empirical relationship between survey
responses and probability of stockholding would seem to support their interpretation as reﬂecting
risk aversion of the value function rather than ρ.
2.6.3 Age Eﬀects
Age eﬀects on net gains result mainly from two factors. First, as the household ages, fewer periods
are left in which to beneﬁt from stocks and pay the access cost. Second, since age eﬀects are
computed at given normalized cash on hand, gains at older ages incorporate revised expectations
10regarding future resources. Fig. 6 shows that predicted age eﬀects are generally negative and
non-linear over the life cycle, for given cash on hand and other characteristics.17 Downward shifts
of the net gains schedule are bigger after the middle of working life (e.g., between 45 and 55), and
much smaller during retirement.18
Age eﬀects are small at the beginning of working life because stockholding tends to be limited
early on and there are still many future periods of life ahead. As working life progresses, fewer years
of high stockholding lie ahead. Unconstrained portfolio shares (second row) are predicted to fall
with age,19 though not if borrowing constraints are binding,20 while assets increase. The net age
eﬀect on stockholding (third row) is positive where borrowing constraints are binding, but negative
otherwise. Moreover, a given level of cash on hand implies progressively worse future prospects,
and thus lower stockholding. Age eﬀects are more substantial in the latter part of working life,
for both reasons. During retirement, precautionary and other saving motives weaken. Moreover,
since retired households face little income uncertainty, their expectations of cash on hand tend to
cluster around current levels, and future stockholding is expected to follow closely the drops of the
stockholding schedule. These factors generate negative net gains from gaining access in retirement.
In the econometric part below, we allow for a non-linear (quadratic) age eﬀect on net gains.
2.6.4 Equity Premium and Volatility
Eﬀects of the equity premium or its volatility on net gains from access can help us understand
year eﬀects (1995 versus 1998) in the econometric section. Comparing 1995 and 1998, perhaps the
two most relevant features are the continuing increase in stockholding participation and the decline
in access costs throughout the 1990s (see Section 4). While a decline in costs clearly increases
net gains from access, the limited theoretical literature seems to imply negligible or negative but
small eﬀects of increased participation on the equity premium.21 There seems to be more empirical
support for the idea that volatility increased, at least over the longer haul.22 However, general
equilibrium literature is still inconclusive regarding eﬀects of increased participation on stock market
volatility23.
Fig. 7 conﬁrms that a reduction in the (perceived) equity premium lowers net gains from access.
Results are shown for expected equity returns of 6 and 12 percent and for college graduates. Faced
with a lower equity premium, the household tilts its portfolio away from stocks (second to fourth
panels), but it also reduces assets held (bottom panel) in view of worse investment prospects.
Eﬀects are similar but much smaller during retirement.
Fig. 8 shows drops in net gains when the benchmark (perceived) standard deviation of the equity
premium (18 percent) is doubled. While the consumption rule remains largely unaﬀected (bottom
panel), increased volatility causes a portfolio switch away from stocks (second row). Households
hold smaller stock amounts, except for low cash on hand where they either do not save or they save
little in stocks. Eﬀects are qualitatively similar across working and retirement periods.24
3E c o n o m e t r i c A p p r o a c h
The conceptual link between a computational portfolio model and empirical studies of stock market
participation, whether in the traditional probit/logit or in the binary quantile regression mode, is
provided by gains from involvement in the stock market net of any associated costs. The compu-
tational model can be used to predict eﬀects on net gains of varying diﬀerent factors while keeping
the rest ﬁx e da ts o m el e v e l ;a n dt h ee c o n o m e t r i cmodel to compute estimates of such eﬀects, con-
trolling for other characteristics. Econometric estimates of eﬀects refer either to mean net gains
11(probit/logit) or to any percentile of net gains (binary quantile regression). It is useful to see if
eﬀects are at least qualitatively consistent across these two net gains constructs, even if neither
the computational nor the econometric model ﬁts portfolio holdings perfectly. The computational
model can shed light on what possibly lies behind eﬀects of each factor, while the econometric
model can additionally yield estimates of demographics of groups at diﬀerent ranges of participa-
tion probabilities and of its implications.
The link between theoretical and empirical modeling is not seamless. Since analytical expres-
sions for net gains cannot be derived, the latent variable speciﬁcation in the econometric model
cannot inherit a particular functional form from theory, although it certainly beneﬁts from quali-
tative results on eﬀects of various factors. Moreover, use of a portfolio model that is rich enough to
allow for zero optimal stock holdings introduces a slight discrepancy between the notion of access in
the theoretical model and survey data where current stock market participation rather than access
is observed. Thus, we implicitly identify those in the sample who held no stocks with households
perceiving negative net gains from access. This may create problems if there are households that
paid the costs of ﬁguring out whether they should invest in stocks but found it optimal not to do
so. Although such cases are unobservable, we doubt that they are quantitatively important in our
data. The reason is that we are focusing on a period of stock market euphoria and of spreading
equity culture, in which households that paid the costs of ﬁguring out optimal stockholding tended
to include stocks in their portfolios.
We apply recent binary quantile regression techniques to study stock market participation prob-
abilities and the distribution of net gains from such participation. As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst
application of such techniques to stock market participation. Binary quantile regression is a natural
approach to the study of participation and has advantages over the more standard probit and logit
techniques. For households with given observable characteristics, binary quantile regression makes
it possible to describe the role of a given factor at any percentile of the (conditional) distribution of
net gains from access, as opposed to merely at the mean of net gains. Secondly, the technique allows
estimation of participation probabilities on the basis of household characteristics and of coeﬃcient
estimates most appropriate for households in the relevant position of the underlying distribution of
net gains. By contrast, standard probit and logit estimation assigns the same coeﬃcient estimates
to all households and results in diﬀerent probability rankings, as illustrated below. Finally, binary
quantile regression makes it possible to quantify more accurately how much harder it is for the ﬁ-
nancial sector to draw into the stockholder pool the next group of potential stockholders, compared
to most likely current marginal stockholders. We conduct all such excercises below.
Formally, existing analyses of stock market participation have relied on standard discrete choice
models of the following general structure:
y∗ = x0β + u (27)
y = I (y∗ ≥ 0) (28)
where y∗ is a latent response variable (in this case, the utility gain from access to stocks net of
entry or participation costs), y is a binary dependent variable observable by the researcher (partic-
ipation or non-participation in the stock market), x is a vector of covariates (typically household
demographic characteristics, ﬁnancial variables, and reported attitudes), and u is speciﬁed to follow
either a standard normal or a logistic distribution.
The usual maximum likelihood methods, probit and logit, allow estimation of the mean of the
distribution of the latent variable y∗ and of covariate eﬀects on this mean alone. Thus, probit or logit
estimation uncovers eﬀects only on the average utility gain from access to stocks in the population,
and it does not allow for diﬀerences of covariate eﬀects among households at diﬀerent points in the
12distribution, e.g. for marginal investors, for those most likely to be the next entrants, and those
that stand to gain a lot or very little from stocks. Moreover, although parametric distributional
assumptions on the error term u usually allow estimation of β by maximum likelihood methods,
excessive use of such assumptions entails the risk of inconsistent estimation in case they are violated.
By contrast, quantile regression originally proposed by Koenker and Basset (1978, 1982) allows
estimation, in principle, of all the percentiles of the distribution of the dependent variable, while its
semiparametric nature greatly reduces the risk of inconsistent estimation. In particular, quantile
regression can provide valid statistical inference in the presence of heterogeneity of unknown form.
As a result, the quantile regression methodology oﬀers a considerably enhanced picture of the eﬀects
of the conditioning variables x across the entire spectrum of net utility gains from access to stocks.
Formally, consider a particular percentile, 0 <τ<1, of the distribution of the utility gains from
access to stocks, y∗, and assume the following linear model for the conditional quantile function
Qy∗ (τ|x):
Qy∗ (τ|x) ≡ F−1
y∗ (τ|x)=x0β (τ) (29)
The model for the τth percentile of the latent variable y∗ can yield a model for the τth percentile of
the binary observable variable y using the equivariance property of quantile functions to monotonic
transformations: for any monotone function h(·), it holds that
Pr(Y< y |x)=Pr(h(Y ) <h (y)|x). (30)
Then it is easily shown that




x0β (τ) ≥ 0
¢
(32)
i so u rp r o p o s e dm o d e lf o rt h eτth percentile of the observable binary variable of stock market
participation y.
Following the formulation of Koenker and Basset (1978), the Binary Quantile Regression (BQR)














where ρτ (ν)=[ τ − I (ν<0)]ν is the check function of Koenker and Basset (1978). The estimator
is normalized to have Euclidean norm equal to unity for purposes of identiﬁcation. This problem
and estimator were ﬁrst studied by Manski (1975, 1985) under the name maximum score estimator.












Manski’s estimator does not specify the form of relation between x and u; it only requires that the
τth quantile of u conditional on x is zero. Based on this assumption, the model can be identiﬁed
up to scale. A similar identiﬁcation problem arises in the case of parametrically speciﬁed probit
and logit. The fact that the error distribution in BQR is left unspeciﬁed forces us to place the
identiﬁcation restriction on the beta coeﬃcients by normalizing their euclidean norm kbk =1
(Manski, 1985).25
13Manski (1985) has shown that his maximum score estimator of β is consistent under the iden-
tifying assumption Qu(τ|x)=0 . However, the estimator is not n1/2-consistent and, asymptotic
normality and subsequent statistical inference cannot be realized. Horowitz (1992) proposed a
modiﬁcation to the maximum score estimator by smoothing the objective function (called ‘score
function’ in this literature). Horowitz (1992), utilizing ideas from nonparametric density and re-
gression estimation, essentially replaces the indicator I(x0b ≥ 0) in the objective function by an
integral of kernels. As a result, Horowitz’s smoothed maximum score estimator solves a suﬃciently
smoothed objective function whose diﬀerence from Manski’s objective function tends to 0 almost
surely as n →∞ .












where {σn} is a sequence of positive real numbers (bandwidths) that converges to zero as n →
∞. K(·) is a continuous bounded function that bears the properties of a cumulative distribution
function; that is, (i) |K(v)| <Mfor some ﬁnite M and all v in (−∞,∞) and, (ii) limv→−∞ K(v)=
0, limv→∞ K(v)=1 .
The smoothed maximum score estimator was shown by Horowitz (1992) to be consistent and,
after centering and suitable normalization, to be asymptotically normal. Its convergence rate is
at least n−2/5 and can become arbitrarily close to n−1/2. Asymptotic normality allows statistical
inference to be carried out in the usual way. However, the ﬁnite sample properties can be very
diﬀerent from the behavior claimed by asymptotic theory. In this paper we derive conﬁdence
intervals by use of bootstrap methodology. Experience with Monte Carlo experiments indicated
that bootstrap can reduce substantially the diﬀerence between exact and nominal coverage levels.
Equally important is the indication that bootstrap-based inference is not very sensitive to the
selection of bandwidth parameter.26
Although the theoretical literature (Manski, 1975; Horowitz, 1992) usually concentrates on the
median case, τ =0 .50, extension to other quantiles is extremely useful when complete charac-
terization of the distribution of the response variable is needed, as in our case, and essential for
theoretical reasons as well (e.g. identiﬁcation, eﬃciency, testing of various hypotheses). Kordas
(2001) provides a useful treatment of these issues and calls this estimator Smoothed Binary Quantile
Regression (SBQR).
Unlike probit and logit, binary quantile regression does not estimate probabilities directly.
However, using the estimated coeﬃcients for each quantile, we can characterize the probability of
participation in the stock market for a given composition of covariates. Since the assumed model
for gains y∗ is Qy∗(τ|x)=x0β(τ), we can use the basic deﬁnition of a quantile to write
Pr(y∗ ≤ x0β(τ)) = τ (36)
In view of (36), the following statements hold, conditional on the value of quantile index x0β(τ):
Pr(y =1 |x0β(τ) > 0) > (1 − τ)
Pr(y =1 |x0β(τ)=0 )=( 1− τ)





Intuitively, (37) indicates a clear relationship between net gains from participation and probability
of participation. Households of given characteristics x can have any level of net gains out of a distri-
bution generated by unobserved heterogeneity among them. However, households characterized by
14ag i v e nx have higher probability of participation, 1−τ, if net gains are zero among x-households at
a lower percentile, τ, of the net gains distribution generated by unobservables. Crudely speaking,
this makes it likely that unobservables will push more x-households into positive net gains and into
participation.27
We can use (37) to describe the characteristics of household groups ranked by their probability
of participation, 1 − τ. As we consider higher probabilities of participation, we are dealing with
observable characteristics that, combined with unobservables, tend to generate greater proportions
of households with positive net gains and hence stock market participation. For instance, while the
unconditional probability that any US household participates is about 50%, three quarters of those
whose characteristics imply 75% probability of participation tend to exhibit positive net gains and
participation. We deﬁne ‘marginal stockholders’ and ‘potential entrants’ as those whose conditional
probability of participation correspondingly exceeds or falls short of the unconditional probability
(50%) by up to 25 percentage points. We describe below the demographic and other characteristics
of these two groups and of the remaining two quartiles that are the most and the least likely to
participate, respectively.
This can be implemented as follows. Consider a particular household with characteristics x0.
In principle, we can compute x0
0β(τ) for all 0 <τ<1. These represent diﬀerent percentiles of
the distribution of net gains generated by unobserved heterogeneity among households sharing
characteristics x0. If we ﬁnd that for, say, τ = τ0 it holds that x0
0β(τ0)=0 , then it follows from
(37) that a household with observables x0 has probability of participating in the stock market
equal to (1−τ0). By repeating this for all households in the sample, we can rank them in terms of
participation probabilities.
In practice, estimates are not computed for all τ, but only for a subset of percentiles to limit
computational costs. We obtain estimates for 19 equally spaced percentiles, from τ =0 .05 to
τ =0 .95, at increments of 0.05. For each x,w eﬁnd the τ that makes x0β(τ) closest to 0 from
below. Having thus assigned households to each of the τ for which we have coeﬃcient estimates,
we group them further into quartiles. We derive the demographic characteristics of these quartiles,
using population weights. We then compare them to those derived by ranking households according
to their probabilities of participation implied by probit or logit estimates of mean net gains.
Besides ranking households in terms of participation prospects, we also compute increases in
household ﬁnancial assets that would raise the probability of participation to some desired level,
keeping the rest of household characteristics ﬁxed. This gives a monetary measure of how much
harder it is for the ﬁnancial sector to attract the likely potential entrants, given their characteristics,
compared to marginal stockholders. This can be done as follows. Suppose that the participation
probability of households with demographics x0 is 1−τ0. Now consider a τ1 <τ 0, that would imply
a higher probability of participation. Construct a new vector x1, ﬁxing all elements to their values
under x0, except for (log) ﬁnancial assets. Solve for the level of log ﬁnancial assets that would bring
about x0
1β(τ1)=0 . From this we can derive the increase in ﬁnancial assets that would bring about
the higher probability of participation 1−τ1, given the remaining characteristics of the household.
Results of all such exercises are presented in Section 5.3.
4 Portfolio Data and Participation Trends
We use pooled data from the most detailed sources on household portfolios, the United States
Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1995 and 1998. The SCF provides information on whether
households hold stocks directly, on whether they hold stocks indirectly (e.g., through mutual funds
or deﬁned contribution pension funds), and on a range of demographic characteristics as well as on
15attitudes towards risk taking, borrowing, saving, etc. Although participation in direct stockholding
by households can also be observed in some European countries, the US SCF allows a much more
precise estimate of participation in indirect stockholding, since it also asks respondents whether
their mutual funds invest in stocks.
Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2001) provide a comprehensive account of stockholding trends.
They report an overall (direct and indirect) stockholding participation rate among households of
48.9 percent in 1998, compared to 40.4 in 1995 and to only 31.6 in 1989. This big spread of equity
culture cannot be traced to an increase in direct participation in stocks. Indeed, by 1998, direct
participation in stockholding was at 19.2 percent, roughly where it was in 1983, bouncing back
from 15.2 percent in 1995. By contrast, participation in indirect stockholding rose dramatically.
Mutual fund ownership rose from 4.5 percent in 1983 to 12.3 percent in 1995, to 16.5 percent in
1998. The demographic transition to an aging population and the concomitant policy measures
induced a move away from deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans and towards deﬁned-contribution plans.
The share of households having a tax-deferred retirement account —either IRA or 401(k)-type— rose
from about 31 percent in 1983 to about 48 percent in 1998.
These increases in participation were occurring at a time when stock returns were rising and
costs of stock market participation were falling. The S&P 500 stock price index rose from 165 in
1983 to 600 in 1995 and to 1,100 in 1998. At the same time, the number of mutual funds rose from
564 in 1980 to 6,778 in 1998 (Investment Company Institute, 1998). Rea and Reid (1998) report
ﬁgures for “total shareholder cost”, that includes fund operating expenses plus distribution costs,
expressed as a percentage of the amount invested in the fund. The sales-weighted average of such
cost ratios for diﬀerent equity funds was 2.25 in 1980, 2.17 in 1988, and only 1.49 by 1997.28
5E c o n o m e t r i c R e s u l t s
We consider the choice to participate in the stock market either directly or indirectly, through
mutual funds or retirement accounts. The latent variable in the econometric speciﬁcation represents
gains net of any entry or participation costs perceived by the household. We control for a number
of household characteristics and for year eﬀects, using the discussion of determinants of gains in
Section 2.6 to interpret relevant ﬁndings. In presenting our results, we compare smoothed binary
quantile regression estimates to those obtained from traditional probit and logit estimation.
5.1 Regressors
Household resources (cash on hand) are measured by the logarithms of ﬁnancial assets and of total
household income. We control for the education level of the household head by including a dummy
variable for high-school dropouts and one for heads with college education or more. The omitted
dummy is for high-school graduates. In Section 2.6, we found conﬂicting eﬀects of education on
gains from access net of access costs.
We allow for a possibly non-linear eﬀect of age on the latent variable by including a linear and a
quadratic term in the age of the household head. Age was shown in subsection 2.6 to have sizeable
eﬀects on gains from stock market access. On the other hand, existing empirical evidence on the
importance of age for participation has been mixed.29
Measuring the degree of risk aversion in Survey data is diﬃcult.30 The Survey of Consumer
Finances tries to elicit instead information on willingness to undertake ﬁnancial risk (such as stock-
holding risk) by asking households to put themselves in one of four categories, ranging from "not
willing to take any ﬁnancial risk" to "willing to take above average risk for above average expected
16return". We introduce a dummy variable identifying households that declare lack of willingness
to undertake any ﬁnancial risk. We also control for whether the household head is non-white or
Hispanic, is not working, and is self-employed. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the
included regressors and for some additional variables in our data set, distinguishing between the
1995 and 1998 samples.
5.2 Standard Approaches: Probit and Logit
The standard approach to estimation of participation equations, namely probit or logit regression,
provides a useful benchmark. Results from these two approaches (Table 2) are quite similar and
consistent with the empirical literature cited in the Introduction.
Education is estimated to have positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on mean gains from
access net of entry and participation costs, and hence on participation, as is typical in existing
literature. Age is estimated to have a nonlinear, hump-shaped, eﬀect on participation. Thus,
controlling for other factors, probit and logit regressions imply that participation is most likely in
the middle range of ages, somewhat less likely for the very young and considerably less likely for
older households. Hump-shaped patterns of participation also appear in simple graphs of partic-
ipation data in the US, though Guiso et al. (2003) have pointed out that this robustness of the
hump-shaped age-participation pattern to econometric controls is not necessarily observed across
European countries.
The dummy variable declaring lack of willingness to undertake ﬁnancial risk exhibits statisti-
cally signiﬁcant negative eﬀects on participation in any kind of stockholding, controlling for other
factors. Being more aﬄuent, in terms of current income or ﬁnancial assets, makes a household more
likely to participate in stocks, consistent with intuition and with the computational model. Self
employment actually reduces the probability of participation. It is possible that this is due to the
small probabilities of income disasters that face the self-employed but are less likely to inﬂuence
salaried employees. Similarly, not working reduces the likelihood that the household will decide to
put money in the stock market. The race variable is typically negative and statistically signiﬁcant
in participation probits, controlling for incomes and wealth. It is hard to know what causes this
eﬀect that appears also in many other studies, but it may be due to the practice of the ﬁnancial
services industry in the US to target to a lesser extent minorities for activity related to the stock
market.
The year dummy for the 1998 Survey relative to the 1995 Survey is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, suggesting that conditions were overall more conducive to stock market participation
at the end of the decade than in the middle. Combined with our computational results, the
positive estimate suggests that adverse eﬀects of increased overall participation on equity premia
and volatility were either negligible or, at any rate, small relative to the beneﬁcial eﬀects of lower
access costs in mutual funds and in retirement accounts that were observed as the decade progressed.
5.3 Quantile Regression
5.3.1 Coeﬃcient Estimates
As explained in Section 3, quantile regression (QR) estimates the inﬂuence of each covariate, on net
gains of households with given characteristics, at diﬀerent percentiles of the net gains distribution,
rather than simply at the mean. In this Section, we discuss our estimates and how they diﬀer
from standard participation probit estimates. Figures 9a and 9b plot binary quantile regression
estimates for each ﬁfth percentile and regressor. Probit estim a t e sa r ep l o t t e da sas t r a i g h t ,d o t t e d
17line, for comparison. The solid line in each panel is the zero line. The light- and dark-shaded areas
represent the 90 percent and 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, respectively. Conﬁdence intervals were
obtained by percentile bootstrap. In the range of percentiles for which the zero line lies within the
chosen conﬁdence interval, the coeﬃcient estimates obtained by quantile regression methods are
not statistically diﬀerent from zero at the corresponding conﬁdence level.
It is worthwhile to stress the meaning of a coeﬃcient estimate at a given quantile τ. This
estimate shows the eﬀect of the corresponding covariate on net gains for households who are at
the τth percentile of the distribution of gains conditional on their characteristics, x. In addition
to this, it shows the eﬀect of the covariate on net gains for households that satisfy x0β(τ)=0 , i.e.
for households with probability of participation conditional on their characteristics equal to 1 − τ.
This latter group of households is a subset of the former, as indicated by (37).
QR supports the importance of current cash on hand for participation, but shifts some weight
from ﬁnancial assets to household income, and emphasizes the role of income around the participa-
tion margin, relative to probit. Fig. 9b (LOGINC) shows that income has a statistically signiﬁcant,
positive, nonlinear eﬀect virtually throughout the distribution of net gains conditional on charac-
teristics. Estimated eﬀects are larger between the 40th and 60th percentiles, and larger than probit
estimates. These refer to households with net gains around the median of their conditional dis-
tribution. They also apply to households with estimated conditional probabilities of participation
between 60% and 40%, around the unconditional probability for US households. QR point estimates
are below probit estimates for most other income quantiles.31 Financial assets (Fig. 9b, LOGFIN)
have consistently positive, signiﬁcant eﬀects on net gains, regardless of the household’s position
in the conditional distribution. For the most part, i.e., between the 30th and the 80th percentile,
QR estimates are fairly constant and close to probit estimates, though somewhat smaller. All in
all, changes in current resources, and especially in household income, caused by recession or other
factors can be important for maintaining or expanding the participation frontier.
Age has statistically signiﬁcant, nonlinear eﬀects on net gains, virtually throughout the con-
ditional distribution (see Fig. 9a, AGE and AGESQ for the linear and quadratic age term, re-
spectively). Figure 10 plots the age proﬁle of net gains from for diﬀerent percentiles using QR
point estimates of coeﬃcients on the linear and squared terms and setting other variables to their
sample means.The age proﬁle of net gains is concave and downward sloping at all percentiles. It
is estimated to be higher than implied by probit around the 50th percentile of the conditional
distribution of gains, and for the participation margin; lower for high percentiles, and much lower
for low percentiles.
Perhaps the most striking diﬀerence with probit refers to the much weaker role of educational
attainment in QR (Fig. 9b). In standard probit (and logit) regressions, there is a clear-cut,
positive role of education. In QR, having a college degree (COLL) has a positive but statistically
insigniﬁcant eﬀect on net gains throughout their conditional distribution. Being a high-school
dropout (LTHS) has a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on net gains, but only for those in the
bottom thirty ﬁve percent of the distribution. This result also implies that low education has a
negative eﬀect only on households with conditional participation probability in excess of 65%. The
QR estimate suggests that the negative probit estimate on low education may be caused largely
by a large negative eﬀect of this factor at the lower end of the gains distribution. One possible
explanation for such mixed ﬁndings on the role of educational attainment may be the tension
between lower entry/access costs and more limited incentive to beneﬁt from the equity premium
that was uncovered in the computational section. In this light, QR estimates for households at
the bottom 35% of the conditional distribution suggest heavier entry/access fees for high-school
dropouts by amounts suﬃcient to oﬀset the extra beneﬁts provided by stockholding to households
18with the age-income proﬁle and income variances of high-school dropouts. In the remaining 65%
of the conditional net gains distribution, eﬀects of cost increases seem to be roughly in line with
the additional beneﬁts from stockholding.
The importance of attitudes to risk found in standard regressions is conﬁrmed by our ﬁndings
(Fig. 9a, NORISK). The estimated coeﬃcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for virtually
all percentiles of the net gains distribution conditional on characteristics. QR point estimates
suggest bigger eﬀects on net gains for households between the 30th and 50th percentiles than the
probit estimate, though the latter is within the conﬁdence intervals for QR estimates in this range.
These estimates also imply bigger eﬀects for households with conditional participation probabilities
between 70% and 50%. QR estimates are smaller (in absolute value) than the probit estimate (and
the latter lies outside the conﬁdence intervals) for percentiles above the 60th.
Although QR estimates for the inﬂuence of the overall economic environment, as proxied by
the 1998 dummy, are consistently positive across quantiles, they are statistically signiﬁcant only for
low percentiles (up to the 35th) and marginally signiﬁcant for households between the 40th and the
55th percentiles (see Fig. 9b, D1998). This implies that such eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant for
households with conditional participation probability in excess of 65% and marginally signiﬁcant
for households with probability between 60% and 45%. This picture is quite diﬀerent from the
positive dummy coeﬃcient estimate in probit regression. It suggests that supply-side developments
between 1995 and 1998, such as drops in participation costs and general euphoria about the stock
market, may have inﬂuenced participation choices of households with high conditional probabilities
of participation, but their role close to the participation margin is less likely to be signiﬁcant. It also
suggests that reversal of the overall positive climate to stockholding could have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on participation of current stockholders, especially if it is reinforced by a worsening of their own
household circumstances, such as income, wealth, attitude to ﬁnancial risk taking or employment
status.32
Race and ethnic origin (Fig. 9a, NONWHITE) have negative eﬀects, but statistically signiﬁcant
only up to the 25th percentile and marginally signiﬁcant between the 30th and the 55th percentile.
The fact that minority eﬀects are not found to be signiﬁcant at other points in the distribution
suggests that the usual explanation for the negative race coeﬃcient in probits, namely more limited
targeting of minorities by the ﬁnancial industry, is likely to be conﬁned to those with higher
conditional probabilities of participation than 50%. Finally, households with self-employed heads
(Fig. 9a, SELFEMP) tend to experience lower net gains from stock market access. Eﬀects of
self-employment are estimated to be bigger (in absolute value) for those around and beyond the
participation margin. This suggests that self-employment is likely to become a progressively more
important deterrent to participation as the stockholder base progressively expands. The next
Section estimates the demographic composition and other relevant characteristics of households at
diﬀerent points in the distribution of gains, with emphasis on marginal stockholders and on most
likely future entrants.
5.3.2 Demographics of Marginal Stockholders and of Potential Entrants
We follow the approach described in Section 3 to rank households in terms of participation proba-
bilities conditional on their characteristics, divide them up into four quartiles, and compute group
demographics using population weights. Results are shown in Table 3.a, for 1995 in the top panel
and for 1998 at the bottom. The ﬁrst column shows the share of each group in the population,
while the second to ﬁfth columns show the corresponding shares in each quartile of the popula-
tion ranked by participation probabilities. Of particular interest are the two middle quartiles, of
19‘marginal stockholders’ as deﬁned above, i.e. those with conditional probability of participation
between 50-75%; and of ‘potential entrants’ with respective probability between 25-50%.
The top and bottom quartiles can be used to gain more conﬁdence in the results, since we ﬁnd
that they accord well with established notions about the characteristics of those most and least
likely to participate. In 1995, the quartile with the highest conditional participation probabilities is
comprised, almost exclusively, by the richest 50% of the population (in terms of ﬁnancial assets or
of income). Only 4 percent of the bottom quartile consists of those rich in ﬁnancial assets and 19
percent of those who are income-rich. Households aged between 35 and 64 are overrepresented in
the top quartile, compared to their population share, while this is true of the youngest and oldest
ages in the bottom quartile. Minorities are underrepresented in the top and overrepresented in the
bottom quartile of the distribution of gains. Non-working households and those reporting lack of
willingness to undertake any ﬁnancial risk are under-represented in the top quartile and seriously
over-represented in the bottom. Representation of college graduates in the top quartile is more
than twice their population share, while in the bottom it is about one third. High school dropouts
are absent from the top quartile, but they are seriously over-represented in the bottom. High-school
graduates are under-represented in the top quartile, but their share of the bottom quartile is about
as much as in the population. Results for 1998 are qualitatively similar and numerically quite close
to those for 1995.
Comparison of the two intermediate quartiles can shed light on the obstacles that further spread
of equity culture is likely to meet, in view of diﬀerences in the proﬁle of potential entrants compared
to marginal stockholders. Such comparison shows that, in 1995, about half of potential future
entrants had below-median ﬁnancial assets and income, almost 90 percent belonged to the middle
two quartiles of ﬁnancial assets, and about two thirds to the middle two quartiles of income. This
outlook changed little between 1995 and 1998, with the exception that in 1998 two thirds of potential
entrants were in the middle two quartiles of income. The majority of potential entrants were below
49 years old in 1995, dropping to 44 percent in 1998. Minorities were a slightly greater proportion
of potential entrants than of marginal stockholders in 1995, but this was reversed in 1998. The
employment status of potential entrants was similar across 1995 and 1998, and quite similar to the
pool of marginal stockholders.
Perhaps the most striking diﬀerence between potential entrants and marginal stockholders lies
in their declared attitudes towards ﬁnancial risk. In 1998, almost two thirds of potential entrants
reported lack of willingness to undertake any ﬁnancial risk, compared to only one quarter of mar-
ginal stockholders. Moreover, while the incidence of such responses dropped signiﬁcantly in the
population between 1995 and 1998, from 46 to 34 percent, it slightly increased among those most
likely to be next in line for entering the stock market. Another interesting ﬁnding is that the two
lower education strata are more heavily represented among potential entrants than among mar-
ginal stockholders, comprising three quarters in both years. This happens, despite a fall in their
proportion in the 1998 population.
These ﬁndings can be compared to those based on probit and logit estimation. Although probit
and logit demographics almost coincide (see Tables 3.b and 3.c), there are some diﬀerences with the
demographics based on QR, especially in the bottom two quartiles that refer to future entrants.33
Still, the overall impression from these demographics is the same, regardless of the method used.34
Table 3d sheds further lights on the characteristics of potential entrants and of marginal stock-
holders, by reporting some additional characteristics not included as covariates in the regressions.
Median net worth drops by about $ 18,000 as we compare these two groups in 1995, but by half
of that in 1998. Homeownership may aﬀect willingness to enter the stock market through various
channels with conﬂicting implications. Homeowners with mortgages have monthly payment com-
20mitments that may discourage them from holding their savings in risky form (Fratantoni, 2001).
On the other hand, they also have access to home equity loans not available to renters. Renters
accumulating down payments for a home may be similarly unwilling to assume ﬁnancial risk and
jeopardize the value of their down payment accumulation. Due to investment in housing, younger
and poorer investors have limited ﬁnancial wealth to invest in stocks, which reduces the beneﬁts of
equity market participation (Cocco, 2004). About three quarters of marginal stockholders in 1995
and in 1998 are homeowners, and these percentages drop by 7-8 percentage points among poten-
tial entrants. However, dramatic changes in homeownership proﬁles (by more than 20 percentage
p o i n t s )a r en o to b s e r v e du n t i lw eg e tt ot h eb o t t o mquartile of households in terms of participation
probabilities.
Ownership of private business equity often takes up a large proportion of a household’s net
worth, and it may discourage introduction of additional, stockholding risk into the portfolio. Still,
Carroll (2001) found that rich households are both much more likely to hold private equity and
riskier ﬁnancial portfolios than the rest. Business equity owners are underrepresented among poten-
tial stockholders and overrepresented among marginal stockholders in both years, with a diﬀerence
of 4 percentage points, or more than one third of such owners in the population.
The SCF includes a question on whether households shop around for the best saving or invest-
ment opportunities, which can be used as an indicator of ﬁnancial alertness. The proportion who
declare that they do drops quite dramatically, from about one third of marginal stockholders to
about a quarter of potential entrants, well below their overall share in the population. Finally,
potential entrants have substantial under-representation of households at the two extreme quartiles
of the overall distribution of net worth, and over-representation of households in the middle two
quartiles. By contrast, marginal stockholders have over-representation of the top two net worth
quartiles.
The more limited willingness of potential entrants to undertake ﬁnancial risk, their lower ﬁ-
nancial alertness when it comes to saving and investment opportunities, the worsening of their
educational background, their younger age, and their more limited overall resources are likely to
pose challenges for the ﬁnancial sector as it attempts to expand the stockholding frontier further.
As described in Section 3, we can also use quantile regression estimates to compute a monetary
measure of how much harder it is likely to be for the ﬁnancial sector to attract this pool of potential
stockholders relative to its experience with marginal stockholders. Since we have coeﬃcient esti-
mates for every ﬁfth percentile, we compute these measures by grouping households over every ﬁve
percentiles, retaining the same degree of precision as above. Table 4 presents increases in household
ﬁnancial assets that would raise the probability of participation of potential stockholders by 25 per-
centage points, to make up for their remaining characteristics and reach corresponding probabilities
of participation of current marginal stockholders. The ﬁrst column presents the current probability
of participation, aggregated over each ﬁve percentiles of the distribution of households ranked by
participation probabilities. The third column shows median increases in ﬁnancial assets required
for households in the corresponding ﬁve percentiles, while the second and the fourth columns show
the 25th and 75th percentiles of such increases in ﬁnancial assets. Median increases in ﬁnancial
assets necessary to move potential entrants to their corresponding position in the distribution of
marginal stockholders range from about $ 33,000 to about $ 150,000. No matter which statistic one
uses, the general impression from Table 4 is that considerable increases in ﬁnancial assets would be
needed to make up for shortcomings in the remaining characteristics of potential stockholders and
induce them to be as receptive to stockholding opportunities as current marginal stockholders.
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In this paper, we estimated the potentially changing role of factors that inﬂuence gains from access
to stockholding opportunities net of any entry and access costs, across the distribution of such gains
conditional on household characteristics. We highlighted potentially conﬂicting inﬂuences on net
gains with the help of a computational portfolio model, and we used empirical estimates to derive
diﬀerences in characteristics of potential entrants relative to marginal investors by the end of the
1990s, when most of the dramatic recent expansion in the stockholder base had already taken place.
We found clear nonlinear eﬀects of ﬁnancial resources (income and ﬁnancial assets) on net gains
from stock market access. Estimated eﬀects of income and ﬁnancial assets, as well as of switches
to the status of not working were found to be signiﬁcant for households around the participation
margin, suggesting that economic downturns could seriously aﬀect participation decisions of such
households. Although standard econometric techniques ﬁnd strong positive eﬀects of education on
participation, quantile regression estimates suggest that education eﬀects refer mainly to having less
than high-school education and are signiﬁcant only for the bottom thirty percent of the conditional
distribution of net gains and for households with conditional probabilities of participation in excess
of 70%. Through computations, we highlighted two conﬂicting possible eﬀe c t so fe d u c a t i o no nn e t
gains, controlling for other characteristics: a positive eﬀect from a reduction in access costs for more
educated households, and a negative one from a reduced need to build up assets due to smaller
variance of income shocks and steeper age-income proﬁle. Willingness to undertake ﬁnancial risk
is estimated to inﬂuence participation across the entire distribution of net gains, while statistically
signiﬁcant positive year eﬀects between 1995 and 1998 are observed only at the bottom of the
distribution and for households with high conditional participation probabilities.
Our ﬁndings on characteristics of those estimated to be marginal stockholders suggest, when
compared to those of potential entrants, that extensive further growth in stock market partici-
pation is likely to pose considerable challenges, in view not only of recessions and stock market
downturns, but also of more limited ﬁnances, younger age, more limited education and ﬁnancial
alertness, and above all signiﬁcantly less self-declared willingness to assume ﬁnancial risk by po-
tential stockholders compared to marginal investors. This poses a hurdle to ﬁnancial practitioners
interested in expanding the stockolder base, whose magnitude is not estimated to be small.
22A Appendix: Numerical Dynamic Programming
In this Appendix, we describe brieﬂy the algorithm Haliassos and Mavridis developed for solving
ﬁnite-horizon portfolio choice models under short sales constraints. The corresponding single-asset
saving models needed for computation of gains from stock market access were solved by converting
into MATLAB Chris Carroll’s Mathematica code described in Carroll (2002). Our MATLAB code
for the portfolio model beneﬁts from some of Carrol’s proposed computational shortcuts for the
saving model, but extends them to multi-asset models in a somewhat diﬀerent direction from that
proposed by Carroll.
The presence of ﬁxed entry and per-period access costs can render solution of the optimization
problem quite complicated. Value functions are not in general diﬀerentiable, the problem is not
convex, and ﬁrst-order conditions are not suﬃcient to determine the optimum. We are not aware
of existing computational studies that handle both types of costs in general form. We handle
the problem posed by ﬁxed entry costs by computing separate value functions under access and
no access, and computing gains as the diﬀerence between the two. As explained in the text,
we introduce one simpliﬁcation: we abstract from people who, after having gained access, decide
to remove stocks from their perceived asset menu and not even consider investing in stocks. We
assume instead that, once access is obtained, households consider the possibility of stock investments
from that time on. Each period, they engage in costly decision making (paying the per-period
access cost) to ﬁgure out whether their cash on hand merits positive stockholding or not. This
simpliﬁcation allows us to focus on ﬁrst-order conditions in deriving optimal solutions. Finally, we
make sure that households with access are always able to pay the per-period access fee without
violating their constraints. Essentially, households with access to stocks and current cash on hand
Xt are programmed to know that they have at their disposal only Xt − Ft, that their choices will
result in having Xt+1 −Ft+1 tomorrow, and that they should not violate short sales constraints or
nonnegativity of consumption.
Policy functions for the portfolio model with two short sales constrains contain three regions: a
low range of normalized cash on hand in which both constraints are binding; an intermediate range
in which the household faces a binding constraint that prevents it from borrowing at the riskless
rate; and an open-ended range of normalized cash on hand in which neither short sales constraint
is binding. We handle these ranges in reverse order. We solve ﬁrst for the penultimate period of
life, T − 2, and then go backwards in time.
A.1 Unconstrained Range













since the household consumes all cash on hand in the last period of life, cT−2 = xT−2, and since
there are no shocks to the permanent component of income during retirement (N ≡ 1).U s i n gt h e























Carroll’s proposed computational shortcut is based on the observation that a FOC such as this is
an equilibrium relationship between optimal choices (here αT−2 and sT−2). Generalized to many
23controls, the approach is to specify a grid of possible optimal values for one control (here: savings
values si
T−2,i=1 ,...,n)a n dﬁnd the corresponding optimal values for the remaining controls
(portfolio shares), using grids for transitory income shocks, UT−1, shocks to the permanent com-
ponent of income, NT−1, and stock returns, e RT−1 obtained by discretizing their corresponding
distributions. In our paper, we used 100 grid points for s, and 50 grid points for each of U, N, and
e R. In Caroll’s consumption-saving case with only one control, consumption can be found by mere
evaluation of the FOC. When controls are more than one (as here), one can solve the FOCs using
a non-linear solver.
The minimum admissible value in the savings grid is (slightly above) what would be required to
produce zero consumption in the ﬁnal period, cT, under the worst possible conﬁguration of income












where ε is small. For each savings value in the grid, we use MATLAB’s nonlinear equation solver
to solve the FOC for the optimal portfolio share that would correspond to it. We thus come up
with a set of pairs (αi
T−2,s i
T−2). For the time being, we consider only the pairs that do not violate






















and the assumption of CRRA felicity allow evaluation of the corresponding optimal consumption




T−2 =[ b βE T−2{(GT−1)




























T−2 + fT−2, where f denotes the ﬁxed access cost. Consumption, saving, and
p o r t f o l i os h a r e sa r et h u sm a p p e dt ot h el e v e l so fn o r m a l i z e dc a s ho nh a n df o rw h i c ht h e yw o u l db e
optimal. Policy rules cT−2(xT−2),s T−2(xT−2), and αT−2(xT−2) for the range of normalized cash on
hand where the short sales constraints are not binding are computed through (linear) interpolation
between these points.
A.2 Binding Constraint on Borrowing at the Riskless Rate
In principle, there are two types of portfolio share-savings pairs that violate the borrowing con-
straints. One exhibits αi
T−2(si
T−2) < 0. This type is not relevant for our problem, as we are
assuming zero correlation between stock returns and income shocks and it will not be optimal for
households to short stocks in order to invest in the riskless asset. The second type, αi
T−2(si
T−2) > 1,
24is relevant and represents cases where the household would like to borrow at the riskless rate to
invest in stocks. To solve for policy rules in this range, we ﬁrst use the procedure described in the
previous subsection to compute the normalized cash on hand that would correspond to each such
pair in the absence of the borrowing constraint. This pinpoints the levels of normalized cash on
hand for which constrained solutions should be sought.
Now, we know that constrained solutions involve saving (exclusively) in stocks and that the
short sales constraint is not binding, unlike the borrowing constraint at the riskless rate. Thus the
FOC for stocks is:
U0(xT−2 − sT−2)=b βE T−2
½
(GT−1)








Using MATLAB’s nonlinear solver, we solve this FOC for the optimal saving (in stocks), si
T−2,
that corresponds to the xi




T−2 − fT−2. Since the constrained portfolio share is 1,t h i s
completes the solution for the particular xi
T−2. We can repeat this procedure for a number of levels
of normalized cash on hand, but it is advisable to ﬁnd ﬁrst the lower limit of this constrained range.
This is the minimum level of normalized cash on hand, x∗
T−2, for which the FOC for investment
in stocks still holds, while the constraint on borrowing at the riskless rate is binding. Below this
level, both constraints are binding.
To determine x∗
T−2, we use the FOC for investment in stocks, since households simply choose
to hold no stocks (in the limit) as opposed to being prevented from short-selling stock:
U0(X∗














ρ + fT−2 (44)
A.3 Both Constraints Binding
In the range of low cash on hand up to x∗
T−2, the household ends up consuming its resources. This
pinpoints the solution fully, as cT−2 = xT−2−fT−2,s T−2 =0 , and the portfolio share is strictly not
deﬁned for non-savers. The policy rule in this range can be plotted simply by drawing the 45-degree
line between the point (x∗
T−2,x ∗
T−2) and the origin (or, more strictly, point (UMin,U Min),s i n c e
normalized cash on hand cannot follow below UMin in this model). This extends a suggestion to
this eﬀect by Carroll for the saving model.
Thus, a complete solution for all three relevant ranges of normalized cash on hand has been
derived for period T −2. Solutions for periods prior to this can be obtained recursively in a similar
fashion, with one modiﬁcation. Instead of imposing that ct+1 = xt+1, which can be assumed for
the entire range of normalized cash on hand only for t = T − 2, we must use instead the policy
function computed in the previous round, ct+1(xt+1), interpolating between points as needed. Value
functions are then computed using the Bellman equation and the policy rules. Given that we need
to compute diﬀerences between value functions from the portfolio and from the single-asset models,
we adopt a relatively ﬁne grid of 1000 points for evaluating (and comparing) value functions.
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29Notes
1See Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2001a, b) and the contributions therein. Among them, Bertaut and
Starr-McCluer (2001) focus especially on the US, and Carroll (2001) on portfolios of the rich in the US.
2For an excellent study of trends in the United States mutual fund industry, see Rea and Reid (1998).
3The starting point for this literature is the stockholding participation puzzle, based on the theoretical point
made by Arrow (1974) that an expected utility maximizer will ﬁnd it optimal to invest an amount ε in the
asset with the expected return premium. Limited stockholding participation in the early to mid 1980s was
documented in US data by King and Leape (1984), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Haliassos and Bertaut
(1995). The factors that determine whether participation occurs or not have been explored by a number of
authors. See, for example, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1997), Heaton and
Lucas (1997, 2000), Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1998), Gollier (2001), Campbell and Viceira (2002),
Haliassos and Michaelides (2003). International comparisons are to be found in Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli
(2001b).
4See the contributions in Guiso et al., 2001a.
5On the potential role of participation costs, see Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Luttmer, (1996), Vayanos
(1998). Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) utilize cross-country variation in participation rates in household-
level data from 6 European countries and the US, and produce evidence in favor of a cost-based explanation of
participation patterns internationally.
6Good examples of recent papers aimed at matching features of stockholding data include Gomes and
Michaelides (2004), and Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2004).
7For inﬁnite-horizon examples of zero stockholding generated by short sales constraints, see Heaton and
Lucas (1997) and Haliassos and Michaelides (2003). The classic paper in the single-asset saving literature that
generated zero saving by use of a no-borrowing constraint is Deaton (1991).
8Although V
S
t is obviously a function of the assumed sequence of per period participation costs, {fs}s≥t,w e
will drop this sequence from the list of arguments for notational simplicity.
9Carroll (1992) estimates variances of idiosyncratic shocks for total US household population using data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,a n dﬁnds 0.01 percent per year both for σ
2
u and for σ
2
n.
10The conﬂicting eﬀect of higher opportunity cost of time for the more educated households is normally
controlled for by allowing explicitly for household income.
11Education may also aﬀect household preferences and constraints in various other, less observable ways, such
as making them less averse to undertaking ﬁnancial risk. The eﬀects of risk aversion are discussed separately
below.
12Results shown are for the benchmark of zero correlation between stock returns and income shocks. Davis and
Willen (2000) found that aggregate equity returns are uncorrelated with occupation-level income innovations,
but some industry-level portfolios and a portfolio formed on ﬁrm size are correlated with income innovations for
a number of occupations. Their ﬁndings suggest that further empirical study of such correlations is warranted.
To the extent that correlations are found to be low or negative for low-education groups and positive for
high-education groups, they raise further the gains from access for low-education relative to high-education
households, and thus reinforce our ﬁndings.
13Per period access costs payable to ensure access through the remaining lifetime can result in negative net
gains. This would not be possible in the absence of per period access costs, as households always have the option
not to hold any stocks.
14Note that curves depicting monetary equivalents start at higher levels of normalized cash on hand for high-
school dropouts than for the other categories. For levels below the starting point of each of these curves, the
household would be willing to borrow in order to pay the ﬁxed entry cost to the stock market, but is unable to
do so because of borrowing constraints.
15Here we have followed the standard practice of assuming the same survival probabilities across education
groups. Since there is some evidence of a link between income and life expectancy, a further factor that might
limit saving incentives, and hence net gains, is more limited life expectancy for less educated households.
However, there is also evidence of a positive link between wealth and health that could work in the opposite
direction.
3016Although a positive relationship between risk aversion and stockholding has also been found in inﬁnite-
horizon models, the age-variations uncovered by a model with ﬁnite lives and retirement periods are quite strik-
ing. For inﬁnite-horizon models with this property, see Heaton and Lucas (1997) and Haliassos and Michaelides
(2003).
17An exception to negativity is shown in comparing gains at age 25 and 35. The cause for higher gains at age
35 is that during the period 25 to 35, stockholding is expected to be low relative to the per period access cost,
so committing early results in lower gains compared to gaining access later.
18Note that it is conceivable that ﬁxed costs of entry also drop with age, as the household becomes more
knowledgeable about its work and ﬁnancial environment in the course of its working life and thus ﬁnds it easier
to ﬁgure out how to begin investing in stocks.
19The reason for the portfolio shift away from stocks as the household ages is that it relies more heavily on
its portfolio of accumulated assets and less heavily on its human wealth to ﬁnance future consumption. As a
result, it becomes progressively less willing to invest a large portion of its wealth in the risky asset. (See also
Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 1999.) Interestingly, this model prediction is in accordance to the advice given
to households by ﬁnancial advisors, not necessarily with the same motivation.
20Thus, borrowing constraints may contribute towards explaining the absence of clear negative age eﬀects
on portfolio shares noted in empirical studies. See, for example, Guiso et al. (2003) and the country studies in
Guiso et al. (2001a).
21A class of general equilibrium models that compare steady states with limited stock market participation
to those with full participation imply that asset returns are not likely to change much in response to more
extensive participation (see Basak and Cuoco, 1998; Heaton and Lucas, 1999; Polkovnichenko, 2000). This
is mainly because marginal stockholders tend to invest much less in stocks than incumbents, since marginal
stockholders tend to exhibit higher risk aversion, more limited wealth and other characteristics that limit their
demand for stocks. There are also models in which increased participation is associated with reductions in the
equity premium (e.g., Peress, 2001; Calvet et al., 2001). However, diﬀerences in characteristics of newcomers
relative to incumbents could even cause a rise in the premium, e.g. if marginal stockholders are on average more
risk averse than incumbents.
22Campbell et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the idiosyncratic volatility of single stocks in the United States has increased
signiﬁcantly over the past 30 years. Over the same time span, also the volatility of the price/earnings ratio of
the Standard&Poor 500 index has increased (Herrera, 2001).
23New entrants increase market liquidity by bringing previously untapped funds into the stock market. In
equilibrium, higher liquidity implies that sellers short of cash can more easily trade with buyers with excess cash.
This tends to reduce market volatility (Pagano, 1989; Allen and Gale, 1994). Herrera (2001) points out that if
new stockholders are more risk averse than previous stockholders, then their stock demand is less responsive
to current stock prices and this can lead to higher price volatility. Peress (2002) points to two conﬂicting
considerations. Although the entry of new investors spreads risks across a bigger pool and this enhanced risk
sharing by itself tends to lower volatility, it also reduces incentives to acquire costly information, which exerts
upward pressure on volatility. The net eﬀect depends on the number of shareholders. Interestingly, if there is an
exogenous reduction in the entry cost to the market for widely held stocks, then volatility increases, because new
entrants do not purchase information and they also reduce the incentives of incumbents to purchase information.
24R e s u l t si nt h i sS e c t i o nc a na l s ob ep u tt oad i ﬀerent use, namely to show eﬀects of heterogeneous perceptions
regarding the equity premium and its volatility among households. Indeed, Kezdi and Willis (2003) provide
interesting preliminary evidence that heterogeneous expectations, in terms both of levels and of degree of
precision, help predict stockholding participation.
25The normalization that the coeﬃcient of a regressor has absolute value equal to 1 is used by Horowitz
(1992). It is assumed that this regressor has probability distribution conditional on the other regressors that is
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. The two normalizations are basically equivalent.
26See Horowitz (1998, 2002).
27Note also that, for given β(τ), the probability statements (37) show that the τth quantile model for y
∗ implies
some relationships between observed data (y,x). Indeed, this was used by Manski (1985) for the identiﬁcation
of parameters β(τ).
28Although most of the dramatic increase in stock market participation was completed by the end of the 1990s,
participation in 2001 was still slightly higher than in 1998, despite the reversal in stock market performance.
31Aizcorbe et al. (2003) report a total stockholding participation rate of 51.9 percent in 2001, up by three
percentage points compared to 1998. Direct participation rose to 21.3 versus 19.2 percent in 1998; mutual fund
participation rose to 17.7 percent versus 16.5 percent in 1998; and participation in retirement accounts rose
from 48.9 percent in 1998 to 52.2 percent in 2001.
29See the contributions in Guiso et al. (2001a).
30See, for example, Guiso and Paiella (2001) for an attempt to measure risk aversion by reference to a
hypothetical lottery oﬀered to respondents.
31Probit estimates, however, often lie within the conﬁdence bands of QR estimates, though not below the
20th percentile.
32This last point is supported by our ﬁndings in Fig. 9a (NOTWORK), where signiﬁcant negative eﬀects are
found for households above the 35th percentile.
33QR-based demographics imply more limited representation of households with below-median ﬁnancial assets
among potential entrants than probit/logit. They also imply more limited presence of very young households
and of those not willing to undertake any ﬁnancial risk in this category. As for the bottom quartile, QR implies
more limited presence of the poorest in ﬁnancial assets or income, of whites, and of those willing to take ﬁnancial
risk in 1995. In 1998, QR implies greater presence of minorities, of those not willing to take any risk, and of
college graduates than probit or logit.
34Any diﬀerences between demographics implied by QR and by standard methods result from diﬀerences in
ranking of households in terms of participation probabilities. A visual representation of such diﬀerences is given in
Figs. 11a, and b. We split each of the two samples into 20 groups of equal (weighted) size in terms of participation
probabilities derived from QR estimates, and compute for each group the (population-weighted) average of
probabilities of participation implied by probit (or logit) estimates. These are then compared to probabilities
implied by QR estimates, derived as described in Section 3. With one small exception, participation probabilities
from all three methods increase together. Probit and logit average probabilities typically fall somewhat below
those implied by quantile regression. Consistent overstatement of participation probabilities by the QR method
is due to the economizing choice not to estimate coeﬃcients for all percentiles of net gains but to set slightly
negative estimates of net gains to zero, thus increasing somewhat the implied probability of participation. Logit
average probabilities are below those from probit for those with less than ﬁfty percent participation probability,
but this reverses for those with more than ﬁfty percent probability of participation.
32Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 25th median 75th 95th
DSTOCKS Indicator for holding stocks directly 0.15 0.006 0 0 0 1
STOCKS Level of direct stock holding 15103.60 1336.473 0 0 0 21358
DEQUITY Indicator for direct or indirect stockholding 0.40 0.01 0 0 1 1
EQUITY Level of direct or indirect stockholding 39442.98 2146.273 0 0 8543 128146
DINDHOL Indicator for indirect stockholding 0.35 0.009 0 0 1 1
INDHOL Level of indirect stockholding 24339.38 1477.633 0 0 5339 101449
NONWHITE Indicator for being non-white or hispanic 0.22 0.008 0 0 0 1
NOTWORK Indicator for not working 0.06 0.004 0 0 0 1
SELFEMP Indicator for being self-employed 0.10 0.005 0 0 0 1
NORISK Indicator for reporting refusal to undertake 
any financial risk
0.46 0.011 0 0 1 1
AGE Age of household head 48.46 0.667 35 45 62 79
LTHS Household head is a high-school dropout 0.19 0.008 0 0 0 1
COLL Household head has college degree or more 0.31 0.009 0 0 1 1
LOGINC Log of total income 10.18 0.107 9.709 10.403 10.913 11.683
LOGFIN Log of financial assets 8.47 0.106 7.004 9.306 10.927 12.685
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 25th median 75th 95th
DSTOCKS Indicator for holding stocks directly 0.19 0.39 0 0 0 1
STOCKS Level of direct stock holding 30169.09 558472.9 0 0 0 60000
DEQUITY Indicator for direct or indirect stockholding 0.48 0.5 0 0 1 1
EQUITY Level of direct or indirect stockholding 70738.62 714088.7 0 0 22000 235000
DINDHOL Indicator for indirect stockholding 0.44 0.5 0 0 1 1
INDHOL Level of indirect stockholding 40569.52 306418.8 0 0 14900 161000
NONWHITE Indicator for being non-white or hispanic 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 1
NOTWORK Indicator for not working 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 1
SELFEMP Indicator for being self-employed 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 1
NORISK Indicator for reporting refusal to undertake 
any financial risk 0.39 0.49 0 0 1 1
AGE Age of household head 48.71 17.32 35 46 61 80
LTHS Household head is a high-school dropout
0.21 0.41 0 0 0 1
COLL Household head has college degree or more 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 1
LOGINC Log of total income 10.21 1.54 9.7 10.42 11 11.75
LOGFIN Log of financial assets 8.9 3.46 7.31 9.7 11.29 13.05
Percentiles
Percentiles
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the 1995 (N=4299) and 1998 (N=4305) subsamples,
computed using SCF survey weights.
33Probit Model
Variable Coeﬃcient Normalized Coef. Std. Err t-stat
Intercept −0.0429 0.00196 −21.9
Household head is not white or Hispanic −0.225 −0.229 0.0494 −4.56
Household head is not working −0.497 −0.506 0.101 −4.92
Household head is self-employed −0.468 −0.476 0.0459 −10.2
Not willing to take any ﬁnancial risk −0.481 −0.489 0.041 −11.7
Age of household head 0.0198 0.0202 0.00651 3.05
Age-squared −3.55e − 4 −3.62e − 4 6.08e − 5 −5.85
Less-than high-school education −0.165 −0.168 0.0609 −2.71
College degree or more 0.1 0.102 0.0394 2.54
Log of total income 0.0669 0.0681 0.0137 4.89
Log of ﬁnancial wealth 0.385 0.391 0.011 34.9
Dummy for 1998 survey 0.168 0.171 0.0356 4.73
Logit Model
Variable Coeﬃcient Normalized Coef. Std. Err t-stat
Intercept −0.076 0.0035 −21.7
Household head is not white or Hispanic −0.369 −0.217 0.0858 −4.3
Household head is not working −0.872 −0.513 0.179 −4.86
Household head is self-employed −0.805 −0.474 0.0814 −9.89
Not willing to take any ﬁnancial risk −0.819 −0.482 0.0705 −11.6
Age of household head 0.0302 0.0178 0.0114 2.66
Age-squared −5.82e − 4 −3.42e − 4 1.07e − 4 −5.46
Less-than high-school education −0.279 −0.165 0.106 −2.64
College degree or more 0.167 0.098 0.0687 2.42
Log of total income 0.126 0.0743 0.0242 5.2
Log of ﬁnancial wealth 0.682 0.401 0.0203 33.5
Dummy for 1998 survey 0.288 0.17 0.0625 4.61
Table 2:ProbitandLogitResultsforParticipationinDirectorIndirectStockholding
34Household Characteristic 1995 sample (0%, 25%) [25%,50%) [50%,75%) [75%,100%)
Lower 25% of financial assets 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00
Between 25% and 50% of financial assets 0.31 0.50 0.24 0.00
Between 50% and 75% of financial assets 0.04 0.37 0.54 0.25
Upper 25% of financial assets 0.00 0.12 0.22 0.75
Lower 25% of income 0.49 0.18 0.04 0.01
Between 25% and 50% of income 0.32 0.37 0.20 0.07
Between 50% and 75% of income 0.16 0.30 0.45 0.25
Upper 25% of income 0.03 0.15 0.31 0.67
Of age less than 34 0.248 0.30 0.21 0.24 0.18
Age between 35 and 49 0.335 0.25 0.31 0.43 0.43
Age between 50 and 64 0.211 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.26
Age more than 65 0.206 0.27 0.31 0.12 0.13
Household head is unemployed 0.064 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.01
Household head is self-employed 0.102 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11
Household head is an employee 0.834 0.76 0.88 0.89 0.88
Household head is white, non-hispanic 0.776 0.68 0.76 0.80 0.96
Non-white or hispanic 0.224 0.32 0.24 0.20 0.04
Willing to undertake financial risk 0.544 0.30 0.38 0.75 0.98
Not willing to undertake any financial risk 0.456 0.70 0.62 0.25 0.02
Less than high school education 0.186 0.35 0.16 0.09 0.00
High-school education 0.507 0.53 0.60 0.52 0.36
College degree or more 0.307 0.13 0.25 0.39 0.64
Household Characteristic 1998 sample (0%, 25%) [25%,50%) [50%,75%) [75%,100%)
Lower 25% of financial assets 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00
Between 25% and 50% of financial assets 0.28 0.47 0.30 0.00
Between 50% and 75% of financial assets 0.04 0.40 0.47 0.28
Upper 25% of financial assets 0.00 0.13 0.23 0.72
Lower 25% of income 0.57 0.25 0.05 0.03
Between 25% and 50% of income 0.27 0.41 0.26 0.11
Between 50% and 75% of income 0.13 0.27 0.37 0.26
Upper 25% of income 0.03 0.08 0.32 0.60
Of age less than 34 0.233 0.31 0.19 0.24 0.15
Age between 35 and 49 0.334 0.26 0.25 0.39 0.43
Age between 50 and 64 0.230 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.27
Age more than 65 0.203 0.26 0.36 0.14 0.14
Household head is unemployed 0.051 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.02
Household head is self-employed 0.256 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.14
Household head is an employee 0.693 0.78 0.89 0.90 0.84
Household head is white, non-hispanic 0.824 0.64 0.78 0.74 0.95
Non-white or hispanic 0.176 0.36 0.22 0.26 0.05
Willing to undertake financial risk 0.659 0.33 0.36 0.75 0.97
Not willing to undertake any financial risk 0.341 0.67 0.64 0.25 0.03
Less than high school education 0.125 0.41 0.22 0.16 0.00
High-school education 0.432 0.46 0.54 0.53 0.39
College degree or more 0.443 0.13 0.23 0.32 0.61
Ranking by Quantile Regression Estimates
Ranking by Quantile Regression Estimates
Table 3.a: Demographic composition of quartiles of the population ranked by participation probabilities. 
Quartiles were constructed using estimates from quantile regression, along with population weights, for each of 
the 1995 and 1998 samples. For method of construction, see text.
35Household Characteristic 1995 sample (0%, 25%) [25%,50%) [50%,75%) [75%,100%)
Lower 25% of financial assets 0.81 0.13 0.00 0.00
Between 25% and 50% of financial assets 0.18 0.57 0.25 0.00
Between 50% and 75% of financial assets 0.01 0.25 0.52 0.25
Upper 25% of financial assets 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.75
Lower 25% of income 0.61 0.20 0.07 0.01
Between 25% and 50% of income 0.28 0.39 0.24 0.06
Between 50% and 75% of income 0.10 0.29 0.42 0.26
Upper 25% of income 0.01 0.12 0.27 0.67
Of age less than 34 0.248 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.17
Age between 35 and 49 0.335 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.45
Age between 50 and 64 0.211 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.26
Age more than 65 0.206 0.31 0.24 0.17 0.12
Household head is unemployed 0.064 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.01
Household head is self-employed 0.102 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.09
Household head is an employee 0.834 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.90
Household head is white, non-hispanic 0.776 0.61 0.77 0.84 0.94
Non-white or hispanic 0.224 0.39 0.23 0.16 0.06
Willing to undertake financial risk 0.544 0.20 0.44 0.71 0.96
Not willing to undertake any financial risk 0.456 0.80 0.56 0.29 0.04
Less than high school education 0.186 0.43 0.17 0.08 0.01
High-school education 0.507 0.50 0.61 0.52 0.37
College degree or more 0.307 0.07 0.22 0.40 0.62
Household Characteristic 1998 sample (0%, 25%) [25%,50%) [50%,75%) [75%,100%)
Lower 25% of financial assets 0.86 0.21 0.00 0.00
Between 25% and 50% of financial assets 0.14 0.52 0.33 0.00
Between 50% and 75% of financial assets 0.01 0.23 0.46 0.26
Upper 25% of financial assets 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.74
Lower 25% of income 0.68 0.31 0.11 0.02
Between 25% and 50% of income 0.23 0.37 0.30 0.11
Between 50% and 75% of income 0.08 0.24 0.35 0.26
Upper 25% of income 0.01 0.08 0.24 0.61
Of age less than 34 0.233 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.14
Age between 35 and 49 0.334 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.45
Age between 50 and 64 0.230 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.29
Age more than 65 0.203 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.13
Household head is unemployed 0.051 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.01
Household head is self-employed 0.256 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12
Household head is an employee 0.693 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.87
Household head is white, non-hispanic 0.824 0.55 0.77 0.81 0.91
Non-white or hispanic 0.176 0.45 0.23 0.19 0.09
Willing to undertake financial risk 0.659 0.22 0.40 0.73 0.95
Not willing to undertake any financial risk 0.341 0.78 0.60 0.27 0.05
Less than high school education 0.125 0.50 0.27 0.11 0.03
High-school education 0.432 0.43 0.52 0.57 0.37
College degree or more 0.443 0.08 0.21 0.32 0.60
Ranking by Probit Estimates
Ranking by Probit Estimates
Table 3.b: Demographic composition of quartiles of the population ranked by participation probabilities. 
Quartiles were constructed using participation probability estimates from our probit runs, along with population 
weights, for each of the 1995 and 1998 samples.
36Household Characteristic 1995 sample (0%, 25%) [25%,50%) [50%,75%) [75%,100%)
Lower 25% of financial assets 0.81 0.13 0.00 0.00
Between 25% and 50% of financial assets 0.18 0.58 0.25 0.00
Between 50% and 75% of financial assets 0.01 0.25 0.53 0.25
Upper 25% of financial assets 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.75
Lower 25% of income 0.62 0.20 0.07 0.01
Between 25% and 50% of income 0.27 0.40 0.24 0.06
Between 50% and 75% of income 0.10 0.29 0.42 0.25
Upper 25% of income 0.01 0.12 0.27 0.67
Of age less than 34 0.248 0.28 0.28 0.25 0.17
Age between 35 and 49 0.335 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.44
Age between 50 and 64 0.211 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.26
Age more than 65 0.206 0.31 0.24 0.17 0.12
Household head is unemployed 0.064 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.01
Household head is self-employed 0.102 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.09
Household head is an employee 0.834 0.76 0.83 0.87 0.90
Household head is white, non-hispanic 0.776 0.62 0.77 0.83 0.94
Non-white or hispanic 0.224 0.38 0.23 0.17 0.06
Willing to undertake financial risk 0.544 0.20 0.44 0.71 0.96
Not willing to undertake any financial risk 0.456 0.80 0.56 0.29 0.04
Less than high school education 0.186 0.43 0.17 0.08 0.01
High-school education 0.507 0.50 0.61 0.52 0.37
College degree or more 0.307 0.07 0.22 0.41 0.62
Household Characteristic 1998 sample (0%, 25%) [25%,50%) [50%,75%) [75%,100%)
Lower 25% of financial assets 0.86 0.21 0.00 0.00
Between 25% and 50% of financial assets 0.14 0.53 0.32 0.00
Between 50% and 75% of financial assets 0.01 0.23 0.47 0.26
Upper 25% of financial assets 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.74
Lower 25% of income 0.68 0.31 0.11 0.02
Between 25% and 50% of income 0.23 0.37 0.30 0.11
Between 50% and 75% of income 0.08 0.24 0.35 0.26
Upper 25% of income 0.01 0.08 0.24 0.61
Of age less than 34 0.233 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.14
Age between 35 and 49 0.334 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.45
Age between 50 and 64 0.230 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.29
Age more than 65 0.203 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.13
Household head is unemployed 0.051 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.01
Household head is self-employed 0.256 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12
Household head is an employee 0.693 0.77 0.83 0.86 0.87
Household head is white, non-hispanic 0.824 0.55 0.77 0.82 0.91
Non-white or hispanic 0.176 0.45 0.23 0.18 0.09
Willing to undertake financial risk 0.659 0.22 0.40 0.73 0.95
Not willing to undertake any financial risk 0.341 0.78 0.60 0.27 0.05
Less than high school education 0.125 0.49 0.27 0.11 0.03
High-school education 0.432 0.43 0.52 0.57 0.37
College degree or more 0.443 0.08 0.21 0.32 0.60
Ranking by Logit Estimates
Ranking by Logit Estimates
Table 3.c: Demographic composition of quartiles of the population ranked by participation probabilities. 
Quartiles were constructed using participation probability estimates from our logit runs, along with population 
weights, for each of the 1995 and 1998 samples.
37Household Characteristic 1995 sample (0%, 25%) [25%,50%) [50%,75%) [75%,100%)
Median Net Worth 60282 8853 67063 85335 260564
Homeownership Indicator 0.65 0.47 0.69 0.76 0.84
Business Equity Ownership Indicator 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.20
Shops around for investment opportunities 0.30 0.27 0.25 0.33 0.39
Lower 25% of Net Worth 0.57 0.13 0.04 0.02
Between 25% and 50% of Net Worth 0.32 0.35 0.27 0.07
Between 50% and 75% of Net Worth 0.10 0.40 0.42 0.26
Upper 25% of Net Worth 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.65
Household Characteristic 1998 sample (0%, 25%) [25%,50%) [50%,75%) [75%,100%)
Median Net Worth 70500 6250 71910 80800 253450
Homeownership Indicator 0.66 0.44 0.67 0.75 0.87
Business Equity Ownership Indicator 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.17
Shops around for investment opportunities 0.30 0.22 0.25 0.31 0.42
Lower 25% of Net Worth 0.51 0.06 0.02 0.01
Between 25% and 50% of Net Worth 0.34 0.33 0.24 0.06
Between 50% and 75% of Net Worth 0.14 0.43 0.42 0.26
Upper 25% of Net Worth 0.02 0.18 0.32 0.67
38
Ranking by Quantile Regression Estimates
Ranking by Quantile Regression Estimates
Table 3.d: Additional demographic characteristics, not included as covariates in regressions, of quartiles of the 
population ranked by participation probabilities. Household rankings are the same as in Table 3.a, for each of the 
1995 and 1998 samples.25th Quantile Median 75th Quantile
0.5 48513 145589 404161
0.45 32099 102543 212927
0.4 27878 120436 283384
0.35 20189 56812 203589
0.3 7521 33095 117580
Increases in Financial Assets
Table 4. Increases in financial assets that would move households 
currently classified as potential stockholders, to the corresponding 
point in the distribution of marginal stockholders. Statistics are 
weighted using population weights. Household classification is done 
using quantile regression estimates. For method of classification and of 
computation of these wealth increases, see text.
Current Participation 
Probability













Figure 1: Age income proﬁles by education category.































































































































































Figure 2: Eﬀects of education on gains from stock market access and on underlying
policy rules. Education levels are high-school dropouts (LTHS), high-school graduates
(HS), and holders of College degree or more (COLL). Policy rules are for the risky
portfolio share, the amount of risky asset holdings, the amount of riskless asset holdings,
and consumption. The solution on the left is for (working) age 45, and on the right for
(retirement) age 70.






































































































































































































Figure 3: The monetary equivalent of gains from stock market access as a function of
normalized cash on hand, with embedded ﬁxed per-period participation costs. The eﬀect
of education, risk aversion of the felicity function, and age are summarized in the top
three rows, with the eﬀect of an equity premium and volatility increase to follow in the
fourth and ﬁfth row, respectively.




































































































































































































































Figure 4: The monetary equivalent of gains from stock market access as a function of
normalized cash on hand without embedding any ﬁxed per-period participation costs. The
eﬀect of education, risk aversion of the felicity function, and age are summarized in the
top three rows, with the eﬀect of an equity premium and volatility increase to follow in
the fourth and ﬁfth row, respectively.






























































































































































Figure 5: Eﬀects of risk aversion of felicity function on gains from stock market access
and on underlying policy rules. Policy rules in order of appearance are for the risky
portfolio share, the size of risky asset holdings, the size of riskless asset holdings, and
consumption. The solution depicted on the left is for age 45, and on the right for
(retirement) age 70. Results are for the education group of College graduates.










































































































































































Figure 6: Age eﬀects on gains from stock market access and on underlying policy rules.
Policy rules in order of appearance are for the risky portfolio share, the size of risky
asset holdings, the size of riskless asset holdings, and consumption. On the left panel we
depict ages from working life, whereas on the right panel a selection of retirement ages
is shown. Results are for households with less than high-school education.













































































































































Figure 7: Eﬀects of the size of equity premium on gains from stock market access and
on underlying policy rules. Policy rules in order of appearance are for the risky portfolio
share, the size of risky asset holdings, the size of riskless asset holdings, and consumption.
The solution depicted is for (working) age 45 and (retirement) age 70, on the left and
on the right panel, respectively. Results shown are for College graduates.




















































































































































Figure 8: Eﬀects of an increase in volatility of risky asset return on gains from stock
market access and on underlying policy rules. Policy rules in order of appearance are for
the risky portfolio share, the size of risky asset holdings, the size of riskless asset holdings,
and consumption. The solution depicted is for (working) age 45 and (retirement) age 70,

































































































































































































































































































Figure 9a: Smoothed Binary Quantile Regression. The light- and dark-shaded areas
represent the 90% and 95% conﬁdence intervals, respectively, and the line portrays
the smoothed binary quantile regression coeﬃcient. The zero level is indicated with a
continuous line, whereas the normalized Probit coeﬃcient with a dotted line. The Probit

































































































































































































Figure 9b: Smoothed Binary Quantile Regression (cont’d.)


















































































































Figure 10: Estimated Eﬀects of Age on Gains from Stockmarket Participation Across
Quantiles. The dotted line represents the Probit estimated proﬁle, whereas the continu-










































































































































































































































Figure11a:Comparison of Quantile Regression Participation Probabilities and 
of themeanProbitandLogitprobabilities within groups sharing the same QR










































































































































































































































Figure 11b: See Notes to Figure 11a. 1998 Sample.
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